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Abstract 
The paper sketches out a theoretical framework for analysing the interplay between eco-efficiency, cognition and 
institutions. It derives from analytical shortfalls of the prevailing literature, which features strongly engineering 
and business economics, by using insights from New Institutional Economics, from Cognitive Science and, 
partly, from Evolutionary Economics. It emphasises the role cognition and institutions play in the adoption of 
“green” technologies by firms. A cognitive perspective derives from recent research on simple heuristics and 
context-based rationality; it is proposed that those findings can serve to analyse decision-making of individual 
actors respectively firms and, thus, should complement economic analysis. A second proposition is that eco-
efficiency and normative rules such as a Factor Four strongly rely upon institutions, i.e. the ability of institutions 
to evolve over time and the development of those institutions that are most appropriate to enhance technological 
change. In this regard, business institutions and competition are crucial, but regulatory needs remain in order to 
safeguard continuity of knowledge creation. The framework allows for an analysis why overall adoption of eco-
efficiency still can be considered relatively slow and why some markets and firms are far ahead. As a brief case 
study the article reflects upon German waste law’s ability to enhance eco-efficiency.  
Keywords: Technical Change, Institutional Change, Cognition, Knowledge Creation, Environmental 
Management, Factor Four 
JEL-Categories: D8, L1, O3, Q2 
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1. Introduction 
Improvements in environmental quality will only occur if technological options become 
available and are implemented. In this context, four different types of environmental 
technologies can be distinguished: 
• End-of-pipe technologies such as scrubber technologies for SO2, NOx and other emissions 
which are added to a production chain; 
• Integrated technologies which allow for the recycling of materials within an existing 
production chain; 
• Eco-efficiency technologies that allow for a reduction of physical production inputs 
(materials, energy, water) while maintaining economic performance;  
• New system designs which completely restructure existing production chains. 
Among these technology choices, eco-efficiency technologies, new system designs and 
related services are of special importance because of their huge application potential as well 
as their low costs (Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Lovins et al., 1999). Though research on the costs 
and benefits of these options at the level of individual firms continues to expand and can be 
expected to grow further within the next years, the available research analysing the cognitive 
and institutional dimensions of these options is still relatively poor. Kemp (1997), van Dijken 
et al. (1999) and Wubben (2001) have conducted some recent works on these items. In a 
broader vein, Söderbaum (1999) and Bizer (1999) reflect upon an institutional foundation of 
ecological economics.  
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It is our main thesis that eco-efficiency and new systems design strongly rely upon cognition 
and institutions,1 i.e. the creativity of the human mind as well as the ability of institutions to 
evolve over time and stimulate technological change. This paper sheds light on what kind of 
cognitive and institutional mechanisms enhance a sustainable technology development. In this 
context, drawbacks of eco-efficiency such as a possible “abandonment of nature” (Hukkinen, 
2001) or the well-known “rebound-effect” lead economics to query cognition and institutions 
too, and not to doubt the overall usefulness of eco-efficiency. Deriving from that thesis, recent 
findings of economics outside the ecological branch provide useful insights into the interplay 
between cognition and institutions. Any new conception of humans as claimed by 
Siebenhüner (2000), if necessary at all, is well advised to begin with a review of recent 
findings in cognitive science (Ostrom, 1998). Two propositions can be formulated: Firstly, 
acknowledging a cognitive perspective leads to permanent search efforts for innovation at the 
level of individual firms that are slightly above an “optimal” level of routine and exploitation 
of existing knowledge. Secondly, business institutions are able to conquer win-win markets, 
thereby internalising negative externalities, if they are guided by normative decision rules and 
by a flexible regulatory framework that sets incentives for knowledge creation. 
To prove both propositions, the following paper will sketch out a theoretical framework based 
upon New Institutional Economics (NIE) and, partly, cognitive science and Evolutionary 
Economics. These branches intensively discuss some new assumptions about the constraints 
individuals face, capabilities they might gain and the processes by which their decisions are 
co-ordinated. In connecting their findings to the realm of ecological economics, the paper will 
demonstrate how and in which areas these assumptions prove to be useful. The paper is 
divided into five sections. The following chapter 2 examines literature on technological 
change towards eco-efficiency and some analytical drawbacks. Chapter 3 introduces recent 
                                                            
1  For the purpose of our paper, an institution is understood as a system of norms with respect to a 
particular set of activities. It consists of informal constraints, formal rules and the enforcement 
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findings from cognitive science and underlines their role in the adoption of “green” 
technologies by firms. Chapter 4 discusses institutional change and its ability to stimulate eco-
efficiency. In chapter 5, the interplay between cognition and institutions is analysed with a 
focus on knowledge creation by both co-operation and competition. Chapter 6 applies insights 
derived from theory to a case study on German waste law and its ability to facilitate eco-
efficiency. The final chapter arrives at conclusions for future research. 
2. On the economics of technological change 
The major role of firms and competition in driving technological change is well known in 
economics. Rosenberg (1994) and several others provide empirical evidence of these 
mechanisms. Recent evolutionary theories offer additional insights (Nelson, 1995). The 
literature on innovation and the environment retains this focus on the diffusion of discrete 
techniques, emphasising the importance of price signals (Jaffe et al., 2000). A striking 
observation is being made on the path–dependency of technological change. Describing, inter 
alia, the typewriter keyboard QWERTY, David (1985), Arthur (1989), and Foray (1997) 
demonstrate that investment decisions are not strictly flexible or perfectly malleable to market 
conditions but instead depend on certain paths or trajectories.  
It could now be argued that path–dependency lead to an inefficient selection of technologies 
by market forces caused by imperfect knowledge and historical accidents. Path–dependencies 
would thus hinder firms from entering the new markets of eco-efficiency. But such a belief 
would be misleading. On the technical level, the necessity of carefully developing, testing and 
improving new technologies is obvious. Rosenberg (1994, p. 13) points to the fact that almost 
three-quarters of R&D costs are related to technical fine-tuning before a new invention starts 
to be produced. Synergistic effects with existing production processes and infrastructures also 
have to be taken into account. New products have to fit into existing structures; otherwise the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
characteristics of both. See: North (e.g. 1990, 1998). 
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overall switching costs become incommensurably high. These technical features provide some 
convincing rational explanations in favour of path dependencies. Using existing technologies 
allows for economies of scale (at a given demand), resulting from sinking production costs 
and increasing learning curves. New technologies and, furthermore, any shift towards a new 
system bears a high risk of sunk costs, as information about their development and their 
market demand is – by definition – largely unknown. According to Schlicht (1998, p. 67) 
path–dependency appears to be close to rational behaviour! It can be assumed that huge 
producers or emerging economies would have incentives to invest in superior technologies for 
single products, even if path dependencies have to be considered.  
While intuitively appealing, such an approach of viewing path–dependencies as part of overall 
market efficiency does not seem to capture the whole story. If it comes to technological 
regimes as composed of technical artefacts, organised on co-evolving market and regulatory 
frameworks, path dependencies become more severe. Walker (2000) stresses with a view to 
large technology systems such as energy supply infrastructure the importance of embedded 
institutional, political and economic commitments that lead to an “entrapment”, i.e. risks of 
inertia and irreversibility. Such technological regimes are endangered to become inefficient 
because of their persistence to any change. This would mean that a change in technological 
regimes requires additional and strong efforts by policies in order to unlock persistent 
trajectories. Berkhout (2002: 3) gives a brief overview on this debate in relation to the 
environment. 
Would these observations reduce the scope of government to the management of change in 
technological regimes? At first glance, the distinction between “efficient” path dependencies 
on markets for usual private goods and “inefficient” path dependencies in technological 
regimes seems to suggest such a policy conclusion. With regard to eco-efficiency, this would 
lead to no further regulatory needs because markets would almost automatically discover 
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opportunities of low hanging fruits. But before arriving at such a conclusion one should ask 
whether the distinction made applies to markets of eco-efficiency. Can eco-efficiency 
technologies be treated as usual private goods? At first sight, eco-efficiency reduces costs and 
lead to profitable innovations like any other technological improvement. Companies will 
indeed try to explore these fascinating opportunities. On the other hand, this is like the notion 
of no big bills left on the sidewalk because somebody else must have picked them up already. 
Even researchers like Porter and v. d. Linde (2000) who emphasise business opportunities of 
eco-efficiency underline information deficits and uncertainties due to unknown market and 
regulatory trends. Our question is whether these barriers are stronger than those usually 
claimed by New Institutional Economics because of cognitive and institutional constraints 
that are unique to environmental technologies. If yes, technological change won’t lead to 
growing efficiency without additional efforts specifically addressing knowledge creation in 
both arenas of businesses and policies. In this case, the relationship between technological 
change and the environment would look slightly more complex than often proposed in debates 
about environmental management. Furthermore, regulatory needs would arise that seem to fall 
between the usual dichotomies of economic incentives and command-and-control approaches. 
Given this hypothesis, a deeper analysis of cognitive and institutional factors in eco-efficiency 
becomes necessary. 
3. Cognitive Perspectives of Eco-Efficiency 
Economic theory usually assumes perfect rationality based upon perfect information when 
individuals make their choices. These assumptions are far stretched. As a potential alternative, 
the “bounded rationality” program based upon parts of cognitive science as developed by 
Simon (1957, 1978), Kahneman and Tversky (1996) has gained attention in New Institutional 
Economics and elsewhere; Rabin (1998) provides an overview on the adaptation of 
psychology within economics. Accordingly, human beings have to cope with cognitive limits; 
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without particular learning efforts, they are condemned to sub-optimal economic 
performance. 
Research on eco-efficiency seems to be misplaced in both programs. Whereas the economic 
standard model usually falls short for dealing with ecological complexities and related 
information deficits, a bounded rationality perspective emphasising biased decision-making 
may underestimate profit-seeking mechanisms and, thus, dynamics of market economies. If 
firms can make a profit with eco-efficiency (as it is proved to be the case, see e.g. Porter and 
v.d. Linde 2000), why should research bother with rationality? Cognitive perspectives, 
however, matter  
• Regarding the development and inducement of any technology since individuals’ and 
firms’ attention and the direction of searching for new information are limited; 
• Regarding the analysis of market trends and selection processes since information-
processing capacities of individuals and firms are limited and shaped by cognitive 
constraints; 
• Regarding adaptation since the development of strategies depends upon cognitive factors 
that guide the search for solutions and link best-practice examples of competitors with 
firms’ capabilities. 
These dimensions are aggravated by the common goods2 dimension of environmental 
technologies. This is especially important when policies address global public goods such as 
the earth’s atmosphere and expect businesses to act in a preventive way. Firms suspect 
preventive measures of being costly because they contribute to a global public good, and free-
riding activities of competitors are expected. Therefore, firms tend to act as second-movers 
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and wait for actions taken by others. In addition, a reduction of cognitive dissonance by 
dispelling gloomy information about the likelihood of any natural disaster is a likely strategy. 
In such a perception, even the low hanging fruits of eco-efficiency are unlikely to be assessed. 
Furthermore, even if they are accounted to be beneficial at the level of individual firms, at 
least a residual quantity of commonly shared or even future benefits remains (positive 
externalities). How should firms calculate these benefits or ask for any share of the economic 
rent as long as they are faced with knowledge and regulatory uncertainties? Wouldn’t they 
expect third parties to profit from those positive externalities and postpone any investment 
decision?  
It thus becomes evident that cognition filters information on eco-efficiency in two regards: (i) 
environmental management is perceived as a contribution to a public good and (ii) some 
benefits are perceived as future benefits that cannot be part of current revenues. Both points 
are more severe for environmental technologies than for other technologies; they are stronger 
than the usual literature on information deficits claims.3 Seen from this angle, the 
dissemination of information about the short-term gains of eco-efficiency and new systems 
design becomes as critically important as the mechanisms of knowledge creation at the level 
of individual firms. Prices won’t do it alone.  
What insights can be drawn from cognitive science in this regard? Surprisingly, recent 
cognitive research provides evidence of good performance while little information is 
processed. Featuring on how individuals deal with uncertainties and how they develop rules to 
stop their search for information, reference is being made to simple heuristics as rules-of-
thumb, which make people smart by enabling them to quickly find proper solutions 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
2 Common goods can be defined as those goods that are not private; e.g. public goods, common-pool 
resources, club goods, and network goods. The term has been coined, inter alia, within the research 
scope of the Max-Planck Project Group on the Law of Common Goods in Bonn, Germany. 
 9 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Chase et al., 1998). Decision heuristics may include a “Take The 
Best” approach, comparing objectives of the most valid clue and ignoring the rest, or a 
”Recognition” approach assuming that well-known clues will infer the target variable. 
Ortmann and Gigerenzer (2000, p. 136) underline the methodological role of content 
specificity in reasoning. A case in point is the surgeon at an emergency ward who has to 
decide immediately about a casualty. Though sometimes mistakes are made, the success rate 
is apparently high. Cognitive short-cuts enable appropriate solutions for day-to-day problems. 
Those simple heuristics can perform as well as any rational choice though they require less 
information and less time. Heuristics rather follow an ecological (sic!) rationality, i.e. they are 
adapted to certain circumstances at certain places. Rationality thus becomes context-based. 
No single heuristic will lead to good decisions independent of the social and physical 
environment. Context-based rationality necessarily implies specificity and refers to both 
social and individual cognitive constraints. Heuristics develop over a cascade of decisions, 
carried on and calibrated by experience among individuals. Choosing among appropriate 
rules, interpreting them and applying them to certain problem-solving processes can be 
regarded as permanent cognitive creation. It is an ongoing, normal process. In this analytical 
context, the economic notion of “shared mental models” as proposed by Denzau and North 
(1994) fits almost perfectly. If research takes the assumption of context-based rationality into 
account for experimental design, studies reveal that many people behave relatively well at 
reasoning about social contracts (Ortmann and Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 139). They intuitively 
assess various benefits resulting from different contracts, thus demonstrating social 
intelligence. It thus appears that simple heuristics and context-based rationality are important 
elements for a cognitive perspective of eco-efficiency, perhaps even for a wider sustainability 
context. Economics may keep some principles of methodological individualism like 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3  Standard information economics assumes an optimal stop taking into account the costs of information 
search and the potential benefits of the new information. Such a stopping rule, however, can hardly 
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assumptions of self-interested, advantage-seeking behaviour, while integrating cognitive 
perspectives. These methodological perspectives are along the thinking of Denzau and North 
(1994) and, in our view, add to some of Norgaard’s (1994) more general remarks on the 
coevolution of technologies, culture and knowledge. 
Applying these general remarks to eco-efficiency at the level of individual firms leads to 
some new insights. When firms start to integrate environmental concerns into their standard 
procedures, they do not need perfect knowledge on environmental constraints and impacts in 
relation to their activities. Rather they need simple heuristics that are able to increase their 
overall environmental performance. These simple heuristics build upon existing competences 
and some traditional patterns of behaviour. They will become part of firm’s overall internal 
procedures, and are not restricted to the scope of single environmental managers. Both top 
managers and the individual employee require at least a basic understanding of these 
heuristics in order to internalise them as part of a firm’s routine. Such a change certainly 
comes at some cost. Appropriate management tools such as the COMPASS-model developed 
by Kuhndt and Liedtke (1999) can lower these cost. A notion like “Factor Four – Doubling 
wealth, halving resource use” (Weizsäcker et. al., 1997)4 serves as normative decision rule for 
mid-term orientation, facilitating the search for solutions beyond optimisation of existing 
trajectories. As a rule-of-thumb it enables developers and strategic planning units within firms 
to look for new business opportunities. In doing so, it fuels capabilities for the “imagination” 
of new ways of combining resources that are required (Loasby, 2001, p. 18). Compared to 
these advantages, the various processes of the International Standardization Organization 
(ISO) are likely to require more information, imply higher transaction costs and do not 
necessarily lead to better outcomes, in particular not for small and medium-sized enterprises.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
apply to situations with huge uncertainties and ongoing knowledge creation. 
4  Factor Four is considered as one normative decision rule; other concepts such as “zero emissions”, 
“Factor 10”, the “natural step” serve similar functions but are not laid down especially here.  
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A cognitive perspective of eco-efficiency would thus underline a combination of normative 
orientation, managerial tools and striving for economic efficiency via procedures of trial and 
error. It will certainly lead to different mechanisms within the various firms as well as on 
different markets. Heuristics develop over time in different contexts. In other words, there is 
no “universal application of eco-efficiency” within the concept as Hukkinen (2001, p. 312) 
asserts, if those cognitive dimensions are applied that are obvious. The statement of Gabel and 
Sinclair-Desgagné (1998, p. 100) that those changes are revolutionary, disruptive and costly 
also seems to be misplaced. By acknowledging cognitive perspectives, eco-efficiency 
strategies are well advised to build upon existing competences and established patterns of 
behaviour, thereby avoiding establishing a totally new organizational code within a firm. It 
rather follows to permanently invest in the creation of new knowledge slightly above a level 
that might be regarded as optimal. Improving eco-efficiency can take a course of 
evolutionary, incremental and low-cost change. Chapter 5 of this paper will elaborate on that 
point. 
4. Institutional Perspectives of Eco-Efficiency 
It is interesting to note that cognitive research seems to deviate from pure individualistic 
approaches and begins to analyse the interplay between individual cognition and social 
institutions. New Institutional Economics has a strong bond on business institutions of firms 
and markets, analysing incomplete contracts, information exchange and enforcement 
procedures. The central idea is that any firm is based on the positions and actions of its 
individual members, i.e. it is not to be understood as a collective entity behaving like an 
individual actor. As long as single firms are not spurred on by inter-firm competition to invest 
in knowledge and skills, continuity and persistence to change are more likely than openness 
and flexibility. In many cases a firm’s leader can pursue his or her self-interest because of less 
effective control (principal-agent problem). The “dynamic capabilities” model of a firm as 
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developed by, inter alia, Langlois and Robertson (1995), Teece and Pisano (1994) provides a 
coherent way of identifying innovative systems of business institutions that allows for the 
permanent accumulation of knowledge. It explicitly takes cognitive and institutional 
perspectives into account. Drawing on that literature, table 1 (see below) provides a typology 
for institutions relevant to technological change. Technological change as pointed out by 
North (1990) and Nelson (2002) depends upon a variety of institutions, with market-based 
institutions partly in a central and partly in an ancillary role. Reflections on an institutional 
mix that tailors eco-efficiency ought to take that variety into account. 
Regarding eco-efficiency, institutional perspectives matter during three stages of the 
production chain: 
• The period when decisions on investments are shaped by the legal and political 
framework, ideologies, and expectations about future developments, where both business 
and governance institutions matter; 
• The adaptation period within a firm when best firms ought to be imitated, where business 
institutions matter most; 
• The period of system renewal when incremental learning effects have come to an end and 
must be superseded by any new innovation where, again, both business and governance 
institutions matter. 
Table 1: A Typology of Institutions Relevant for Technical Change 
Institution Characteristics Example 
Business institutions Internal formal or informal 
institution 
a) Business contracts, hierarchical 
order, 
b) Routines, business culture 
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Technological standards Internal, hybrid or outer formal 
institution 
a) Agreement among firms 
b) International Standardization 
Organisation (ISO) 
c) Statutory order by governments 
Legal institutions for market 
regulation 
Outer formal institution with direct 
impacts 
Property rights, competition law, 
tax law, liability law, business law 
Institutions for the provision of 
public or other common goods 
Outer formal institutions with 
indirect impacts 
Education, research, security, 
macroeconomic stability 
Informal institutions Informal societal institutions Customs, ethical norms, ideologies, 
general expectations etc. 
Source: own compilation. 
Technical change can be expected to run smoothly within a stabile institutional frame 
(exceptions resulting from “serendipity” inventions coming out of the blue indeed have to be 
admitted). However, as institutions change over time and are challenged to change by 
cognitive creation and/or competing institutions, the situation becomes more complex. Our 
thesis is that only incremental technical change of private goods remains within the scope of 
business institutions, whereas switching from one trajectory to another and integrating 
common goods strongly relies upon combining flexible business institutions such as new 
firms, networks or property rights with a foreseeable change in the regulatory framework 
allowing business institutions to adapt over time. This combination is crucial for the overall 
accumulation of knowledge in economic development. As Metcalfe (2001, p. 20) puts it: “It is 
the combination of institutions for selection and development that gives to capitalism its 
undoubted potential for change”. Given our notions of heuristics, context-based rationality, 
and institutional path–dependency as outlined by David (1994) and North (1998), those 
processes can evolve, but take some time and are hard to predict.  
Change towards a more sustainable technology development is highly intertwined with 
cognitive and institutional factors. Path dependencies matter in both areas too. They do not 
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start at any fixed time (T) caused by a singular decision, but rather during a stage of mutually 
interdependent decisions and frames lasting from the decision-making period to their internal 
adaptation. After a path has started to emerge, routine effects stabilise existing cognition and 
business institutions. For this reason, the overall costs of changing from one path to another 
become higher than without looking at cognitive and institutional dimensions. This is 
especially important for those eco-efficiency options which may be beneficial in standard 
economic terms but which require different images (e.g. small and light instead of large and 
massive). A technical innovation favouring a longer durability of materials or goods depends 
upon a complementary institutional innovation enabling business to move from production-
based to service-based value.  
Again, normative decision rules like a Factor Four stimulate the search for innovation on a 
broad basis: 
• In the beginning, they break business managers out of mental models favouring 
environmental pressure towards “thinking outside the square” and more radical change 
(investment decision period);5 
• After eco-efficiency has been adopted in general, they add higher aspirations to 
environmental management that go beyond incremental technological change and 
move the whole item up in a firm’s hierarchy (adaptation period); 
• When considering new R&D strategies later on, they facilitate more radical change by 
either a combination of incremental changes within a certain trajectory (e.g. hypercar) 
or by changing from one trajectory to another (e.g. new energy systems, period of 
system renewal). 
                                                            
5  I am grateful to one of the reviewers for helpful remarks on the function of a heuristic like Factor Four. 
 15 
The crucial question for eco-efficiency remains as to what extent business institutions adopt to 
new challenges under prevailing conditions of insufficient information-processing capacities 
and typical market failures. How do business institutions evolve if they seek to escape the trap 
of reducing complexities and uncertainties down to business plans and management tools? It 
is exactly here that firms and markets must gain some orientation from outside. In such a 
situation processes of fundamental learning as analysed by Siegenthaler (1997)6 must 
commence. No single rationality, neither individual nor market-based nor political, possesses 
enough knowledge about new institutions for an overall change and their impacts on 
technological change.7 That knowledge is only created by evolutionary change itself. Here, 
the interaction of business institutions with the set of capabilities located in national 
organisations and the frameworks of law and politics arises on the research agenda. Research 
on eco-efficiency has to query knowledge creation and institutional progress beyond markets 
and firms. 
5. Knowledge Creation by Co-operation and Competition 
Who creates knowledge for markets if not markets themselves? A simple, but straightforward 
answer for knowledge creation is “let’s get together”. Individuals create knowledge about 
solutions to problems via social learning processes. Such processes rely heavily on 
communication or, more precisely, on understanding the problem as well as on developing 
and testing new rules (Denzau and North, 1994, pp. 18 – 20; Ostrom, 1998, pp. 12 - 14). 
Norgaard (1994, pp. 147ff.) emphasizes in a similar vein (but in a slightly different language) 
the social dimension of knowing. In practical terms, it means the exchange of analysis, the 
development of new orientation, and it might even include tentative thoughts about business 
                                                            
6  According to Siegenthaler (1997: 756), fundamental learning involves a change in cognitive rules, a 
change in the rules, which govern individual information processing. It follows a situation of 
fundamental uncertainty characterised by a lack of confidence in such rules. 
7  I do not deny the Kantian perspective of detecting imperatives from rationality. Our definition of 
institutions applies to a broader context and includes the social environment, i.e. the setting, 
enforcement characteristics, and the acceptance of rules. 
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strategies. A proper mix of individuals as well as of competences and skills are crucial factors 
to any success. A sound and reliable leadership integrating different perspectives, working 
with (partly) shared mental models, dealing fairly with conflicts and aiming at common 
solutions is thus a critical element of learning processes. According to Ostrom (1998) and 
Siegenthaler (1997), new rules must be designed and weighed extremely carefully outside 
competitive markets within such groups of co-operative learning. New business institutions 
can be developed in firms, networks or niche markets. Afterwards they still have to pass their 
reality test. Here, markets and the actual conditions in society are back on the game. A 
preliminary test on niche markets provides an important intermediate step towards their full 
release onto national and international markets. 
Can firms undertake such an exercise without hampering the specific core competence, which 
has developed over time? They surely can, but they have to weigh up the associated 
advantages and disadvantages. Whether firms take on the risk of changing their core 
competence will largely be related to their capabilities, i.e. to the costs of creating new 
capabilities and to their perception of the social and political environment. Recent theorising 
about a knowledge-based firm (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Grant, 1996; Granstrand, 1998; March, 
1999) offers some methodological tools in analysing these processes. According to these 
findings, innovative firms develop new core capabilities by permanently striving for solutions 
to customers’ problems, the integration of external knowledge, experimenting, and 
implementation of new findings. According to Hart (1995, pp. 1002 – 1004), such a process 
should actively involve stakeholders from the public. This is, indeed, a laborious task, which 
is illustrated by fig. 1. Such permanent striving for innovations does not totally coincide with 
the business model outlined by Gabel and Sinclair-Dasgagné (1998, pp. 108 – 115; 2001). 
Both authors seem to view business institutions mainly as internal constraints, whereas our 
approach views business institutions as capability that derives from individual cognitive 
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abilities plus organisational features. Here, our cognitive and institutional perspectives deviate 
from a traditional approach seeking to minimise transaction costs and underline the necessity 
to generate new knowledge by individual and organisational efforts.  
Figure 1: Knowledge creation in firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Leonard-Barton 1995. 
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competition remain important in any sustainable technology development and related 
research. 
Some regulatory consequences still have to be pointed out. One relates to government. 
Government hardly possesses all the information necessary to steer business and society in a 
certain direction (e.g. to enhance eco-efficiency) by a one-time shot of framing. One 
comparative knowledge advantage of governments can be seen in setting quality targets for 
the environment, but governments are especially weak regarding options for action at the 
micro level and the co-ordination thereof. At the level of decentralised decisions, markets can 
be expected to work better. Markets are able to produce business institutions and allocation 
mechanisms as soon as any minimum orientation set by targets and framing principles 
becomes clear. Given necessary regulatory deficits, such a framework must evolve over time 
and maintain some supervisory functions. Business institutions can do a good job in 
internalising externalities, but they surely cannot completely solve common-good problems 
(Ostrom, 1998, p. 17). Governments are responsible for setting the framework conditions and 
organising a process by which new knowledge on managing the commons can be gained, 
while markets are responsible for finding and managing solutions. Society is a critical factor 
in both areas, resulting from its different roles as voter, employee and consumer. Having 
underlined these different responsibilities, one should remember that the processes of setting 
targets and finding instruments are interrelated: each side has to co-operate with the other 
(Wegner, 1997). Such a co-operation is not meant in the sense of integration, but rather in the 
sense of mutual interdependence. The connection is characterised by on-and-off factors, with 
each activity functioning at a proper time and in a proper manner. Here, research might refer 
to recent analysis of transaction-cost politics (Dixit, 2000) and information economics of 
political processes (Stiglitz, 1998), and not to old-fashioned welfare economics 
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Figure 2: The emergence of new institutions between markets and governments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
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8  I do not enter the realm of regulatory competition here; for a balanced overview see v.d. Berg (2000) 
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Markets 
Institutional 
change 
 
Agenda 
Setting 
Test 
Politics Revi
ew 
Supervision 
Institutions 
 20 
as ongoing market failures during times of transition. Some regulatory competition between 
governments and businesses during agenda–setting can thus be seen as a response to the 
question what institutional mechanisms may provide most favourable outcomes. This 
proposition is based upon the need for experiments as indicated in figure 1 above. In other 
words: self-regulation of markets may sometimes offer better results than regulation, but a 
permanent supervision has to be guaranteed by governments. Again, this perspective is 
slightly different to the view outlined by Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1998, p. 113; 2001) as 
it tries to avoid any “stunning blow” recommended by both authors and focuses on 
knowledge-creating effects of economic or legal regulatory approaches. Such governance can 
be seen as an ongoing and powerful, but imperfect effort and not as a one-time decision of 
setting a frame. 
Specific regulatory consequences for eco-efficiency surely depend upon domestic institutions 
in a country. What seems to be important is the notion of evolutionary competition driven by 
small and medium-sized companies that has to be supported by legal principles and 
authorities. In addition, normative decision rules like a Factor Four spurs competitive markets 
better than single technological standards to invest in new knowledge. Both elements of a 
regulatory framework ought to be accompanied by economic incentives such as eco-taxes 
because price mechanism remains to be an important communication tool. As knowledge 
generation is a decentralised process, legal requirements for business accounting as well as 
open access to this information become relevant. Any technological prospect, however 
optimistic it might be, thus depends upon a proper regulation for competitive markets and 
knowledge generation, not on technological change itself. 
6. The Case of Waste and Resource Management 
The methodological advantage of cognitive and institutional perspectives can be illustrated by 
considering an example: waste and resource management as a possible starting point for eco-
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efficiency. It is illustrative because it strongly relies upon business action (and private 
households that are not considered here) as well as on regulatory efforts by governments. If 
cognitive and institutional perspectives are worth pursuing for research, our analysis should 
be able to provide valuable insights beyond prices and property rights. Following that attempt, 
analysis starts with sound problem definition. Waste management and policies differ 
significantly if they are directed to disposal problems on the one hand, or if they, on the other 
hand, take into account the broader context of saving scarce resources, contributing to lower 
overall emission levels, and intervening less in natural systems. The latter, indeed, is the very 
essence of ecological economics and eco-efficiency.  
In Germany, politics has undertaken an important step in formulating integrated 
environmental policies by reformulating existing waste law into a Waste Avoidance, 
Recycling and Disposal Act (Kreislaufwirtschafts-/Abfallgesetz) which came into force on 7 
October 1996. It extends the previous waste concept by including those substances, surpluses 
and residues, which are neither deliberately produced nor used for any purpose. The 
cornerstones of the new legislation are: a) consistent application of the Polluter-Pays-
Principle, b) creation of a prevention-oriented hierarchy of obligations (waste avoidance 
before thermal or material recycling), c) producers’ responsibility for their products (to be 
reinforced by statutory order), d) extending opportunities for the privatisation of waste 
disposal. 
At first glance, the construction of the Waste Avoidance, Recycling and Disposal Act looks 
like a promising way of shifting from pure disposal management to comprehensive solutions 
including eco-efficiency. It allows private waste businesses to be profitable and it should lead 
to manifold, decentralised solutions including the development of new markets between 
producers and users of recyclable materials. Almost six years after the Act entered into force, 
however, the expected gold rush in the waste avoidance industry has not yet taken place.  
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Instead, orientation deficits are stressed, inter alia, at the international recycling trade fair 
‘Entsorga’ in Cologne 2000. Disposal is declining, thermal recycling facilities are running, 
but other recycling activities, waste avoidance and resource savings are still in a premature 
stage. Since 1990, overall resource use has been stagnating rather than declining (see table 2). 
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Table 2: Trends in German Waste Production and Resource Use 
 1990 1993 1997 2000 
Waste Disposal 130.3 90.8 49.4 n.n. 
Waste RecyclingA 14.2 19.8 30.8 n.n. 
Resource UseB 1 460 1 413 1 440 1 432 
In Mill. Tons, figures for 1997 and 2000 on a tentative basis. 
A = Includes thermal recycling, other forms of incineration and biomass recycling. 
B = Includes raw material extraction in Germany used for economic purposes plus imports of raw materials. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office 2001, www.destatis.de (6 March 2002). 
What are the reasons for such a low adoption of waste avoidance and resource saving 
strategies? Along with traditional economics one may start analysis by referring to price 
developments. Here, competition on the markets for thermal and energetic recycling as well 
as the transition period until the disposal order of the “TA Siedlungsabfall” enters into force 
in 2005 has forced business’ waste prices to stagnate or even to decline (Cantner, 2001; SRU, 
2002). Beyond that analysis, information asymmetries on high quality waste management also 
have to be taken into account. The EU single market currently reinforces these economic 
distortions, as thermal recycling options outside Germany have become extremely cheap 
while information about their quality is poor. This coincides with widely differing 
environmental standards for recycling facilities in the EU. Under these conditions, emerging 
material recycling and waste avoidance industries maintain good arguments for postponing 
their investments. Waste and resource legislation does not yet lure out eco-efficiency. 
These findings underline the usefulness of New Institutional Economics applied to waste 
issues and are well in line with our framework. Beginning here, a more particular analysis 
drawing on cognitive findings can depart. The question is why the emerging paradigm of eco-
efficiency could not yet overcome these barriers if pursuing such a strategy is profitable now. 
Addressing this question, our cognitive perspective refers to the unclear scope of problem 
definition. Though articles 1 and 4 of the German Waste Avoidance Act refer rhetorically to 
resource saving and waste avoidance, the whole act regulates nothing else but disposal and 
recycling. Firms’ attention almost naturally follows these constraints. They do not yet have an 
incentive to assess new business markets.  
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Furthermore, the legal notions of resource saving and waste avoidance are vague and remain 
to be translated into business terms. As Ebreo and Vining (2001) point out, waste avoidance is 
perceived different to recycling! Any target for resource productivity like Factor Four would 
offer the advantage of being scored at the level of individual businesses, but there is nothing 
like that in the law. Context-based behaviour at the level of individual firms adds to these 
deficits insofar as the economic potential of reusing or selling materials, steam, heat, the 
redesign of products, etc. is likely to be examined in a superficial way or even grossly ignored 
as long as no legal or economic incentive is advisable. Existing business institutions such as 
contracts, internal procedures, customer relationships, the pull-effect of recycling facilities, 
etc., can still be regarded tighter in their constraints than the envisaged options of waste 
avoidance and resource saving. Knowledge creating institutions such as accounting or 
reporting obligations on resource use are not yet part of German waste legislation.  
On the other hand, the manifold existing initiatives to disseminate information on eco-
efficiency such as the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the 
trade fairs in Duesseldorf and Klagenfurt etc. can be regarded experimental and don’t yet 
outreach market niches. Against this background, it can hardly be expected for eco-efficiency 
to evolve from existing waste legislation, even if some principles are stated. Regulatory 
policies for eco-efficiency need a bias on permanent knowledge creation, and a departure 
from a framework for internalisation of disposal cost. According to our view, a Factor Four 
target (or a comparable one) for increasing eco-efficiency, reporting and accounting 
guidelines, agencies and other institutions for knowledge dissemination and transformation as 
well as a campaign driven by private initiatives would do a better job. 
It is our view that such cognitive and institutional analysis offers useful insights into 
identifying constraints, concrete impediments to implementation, and capabilities of 
businesses, in particular when specific markets are analysed. It may complement traditional 
 25 
analysis in regard to waste disposal and recycling. Some comparative advantage can be seen 
as soon as emerging markets are to be analysed. Here, our methodological focus on novelty, 
on knowledge creation as well as on the proper institutional mix between governments, firms, 
and markets, seems to provide original insights beyond traditional economics.  
7. Cognition and Institutions on the Research Agenda 
To sum up, research perspectives on cognitive and institutional dimensions are critical to any 
further progress of eco-efficiency analysis. Whether or not related concepts like waste 
avoidance, resource management, zero emissions, and Factor Four will gain importance will 
depend upon the methodological acknowledgement of heuristics, context-based rationality 
and institutional change. Waiting for pioneering examples to trickle down into the economy 
would neglect both dimensions of technical change. A public provision of information on 
success stories would neglect the costs of knowledge generation and, thus, fall short of 
transforming that information into useful know how for specific firms. Both firms and policy–
makers (as well as other actors) are challenged to design appropriate institutions that facilitate 
knowledge creation and allow for a maximum of adaptation flexibility at the micro level 
while safeguarding the evolution of a framework at the macro level. In this regard, both co-
operation and competition remain important. Our proposition regarding some regulatory 
competition between business’ and governments’ institutions of market regulation will 
perhaps lead to new governance perspectives. Accordingly, the good news is a capability of 
markets to internalise externalities and to provide for common goods, the bad news is its 
limitation in combination with limited governments’ capacities. How and which types of 
institution make better policy and allow for sufficient knowledge creation at the micro level 
deserves further research. 
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Indeed, New Institutional Economics has already done a great deal in putting these ideas on 
the economic map. The view derived from these insights is different to the conventional 
assumption of minimising any institutional impact. It too departs from a division of labour 
that views governments autonomous from markets. We believe that our theoretical framework 
will allow for integrating more general questions of managing sustainability, too, while being 
based upon sound assumptions of economic behaviour. In following that perspective, research 
can address diversity between actors and uncertainties about future developments. It will be 
able to analyse evolving markets as well as the impacts of regulation and other social impacts 
on markets. Of course, discovering the overall interaction between ecological systems, 
cognition, eco-efficiency, technical and institutional change will take a long time – but it will 
be a fascinating journey. 
Acknowledgements 
The article benefited much from a visiting fellowship at the Max-Planck Project Group on the 
Law of Common Goods in Bonn. An earlier version received an award at an IHDP workshop 
in Schloss Wendgräben nearby Magdeburg convened by Carlo Jäger and Joachim Weimann 
under the auspices of the German Research Association (DFG). Comments from Peter 
Soderbaum and Peter Bartelmus as well as from three anonymous reviewers and discussions 
with Kilian Bizer, Chris Mantzavinos, and Hans Nutzinger are gratefully acknowledged. 
Jackie Sairawan was instructive in language editing. 
References  
Arthur, B. W., 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns, and Lock-In by historical small events. 
Economic Journal 99 (March), pp. 116 – 131. 
Berg, R. v.d., 2000. Regulatory competition in Europe, Kyklos 53, pp. 435 – 466. 
Berkhout, F. 2002. Technological regimes, path dependency and the environment. Global Environmental Change 
12, pp. 1 – 4. 
Bizer, K., 1999. Perspectives for economic research into sustainable policies. In: I. Ring et al. (Editors), 
Regional Sustainability. Applied Ecological Economics Bridging the Gap Between Natural and Social 
Sciences, Berlin et al, pp. 213 – 229. 
Cantner, J, 2001. Marktbesonderheiten in der Siedlungswirtschaft. Zur aktuellen Frage der Privatisierung der 
öffentlichen Abfallentsorgung. Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht (ZfU), 24, pp. 83 – 120. 
Chase, V., Hertwig, R. and Gigerenzer, G., 1998. Visions of rationality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (6), pp. 
206 – 214. 
David, P., 1985. Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review 75 (2), pp. 332 - 337. 
David, P., 1994. Why are institutions the “Carriers of History”: Path dependence and the evolution of 
conventions, organizations and institutions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 5 (2), pp. 205 – 
220. 
Denzau, A. T. and North, D. 1994. Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. Kyklos, Vol. 47, pp. 3 – 
31. 
 27 
v. Dijken, K. et al. (Editors), 1999. Adoption of Environmental Innovations. The Dynamics of Innovation as 
Interplay between Business Competence, Environmental Orientation and Network Involvement, 
Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Dixit, A. K., 20003. The Making of Economic Policy. A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge 
(MIT). 
Ebreo, A. and Vining, J., 2001. How similar are recycling and waste reduction? Environment and Behaviour 33, 
(3), pp. 424 – 448. 
Federal Statistical Office = Statistisches Bundesamt 2001. Umwelt. Bericht des Statistischen Bundesamtes zu 
den Umweltökonomischen Gesamtrechnungen 2001. Bonn. 
Foray, D., 1997. The dynamic implications of increasing returns: Technological change and path dependence 
inefficiency. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, pp. 733 – 752. 
Gabel, H.L. and Sinclair-Desgagné, B., 1998. The firm, its routines and the environment. In: T. Tietenberg and 
H. Folmer (Editors), The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1998/99. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp. 89 – 118. 
Gabel, H.L. and Sinclair-Desgagné, B., 2001. The firm, its procedures and win-win environmental regulations. 
In: H. Folmer et al. (Editors), Frontiers of Environmental Economics, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham/Northampton. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. and the ABC Research Group, 1999. Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Granstrand, O., 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy 27, pp. 465 – 489. 
Grant, R. M., 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 17, Special 
Issue (Winter), pp. 109 – 122. 
Hart, S.L., 1995. A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management Review 20 (4), pp. 996 – 
1014. 
Hukkinen, J., 2001. Eco-efficiency as abandonment of nature. Ecological Economics 38, pp. 311-315. 
Jaffee, A.B., Newell, R.G. and Stavins, R., 2000. Technological change and the environment. NBER working 
paper 7970, Cambridge. 
Kemp, R., 1997. Environmental policy and technological change, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Brookfield. 
Kerber, W. and Saam, NJ, 2001. Competition as a test of hypotheses: Simulation of knowledge-generating 
markets. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 4 (3), pp. 66-100. 
Kahnemann, D. and Tversky, A., 1996. On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review 101, pp. 582 
– 591. 
Kuhndt, M. and Liedtke, C., 1999. “COMPASS — Companies’ and Sectors’ Path to Sustainability — The 
Methodology”. Wuppertal Institute, Wuppertal. 
Langlois, R. N. and Robertson, P. L., 1995. Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: A Dynamic Theory of 
Business Institutions, Routledge Publisher, London . 
Loasby, B., 2001. Cognition, imagination and institutions in demand creation. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 11, pp. 7 – 21. 
Leonard-Barton, D., 1995. Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation, 
Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Lovins, A., Lovins, L. H. and Hawken, P., 1999. A road map to natural capitalism. Harvard Business Review, 
May-June, pp. 145 – 158. 
March, J.G., 1999. The Pursuit of Organizational Intelligence, Blackwell Publisher, Oxford  
Metcalfe, S. 2001. Institutions and progress. Industrial and Corporate Change, 10 (3), pp. 561 – 586. 
Nelson, R., 1995. Recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change. Journal of Economic Literature 33, 
(March), pp. 48 – 90. 
Nelson, R. 2002. The problem of market bias in modern capitalist economies. Industrial and Corporate Change 
11 (2), pp. 207 – 244. 
Norgaad, R.B., 1994. Development Betrayed. The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the 
Future, Routledge Publisher, London and New York. 
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 28 
North, D.C., 1998. Five propositions about institutional change. In: J. Knight and I. Sened (Eds.), Explaining 
Social Institutions, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 15 – 26. 
Ortmann, A. and Gigerenzer, G., 2000. Reasoning in economics and psychology: Why social context matters. In: 
D. Kiwit et al. (Editors), Cognition, Rationality, and Institutions, Springer Publishers, Berlin et al., pp. 
131 – 145. 
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioural approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. American Political 
Science Review, 92 (1), pp. 1 – 22. 
Porter, M.; Linde, C.v.d. (2000): Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. In: E.F.M. Wubben (Editor): The 
Dynamics of the Eco-Efficient Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp. 33 – 55. 
Rabin, M., 1998. Psychology and economics. Journal of Economic Literature XXXVI (March), pp. 11 – 46. 
Rosenberg, N., 1994. Exploring the Black Box. Technology, Economics, and History, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Schlicht, E., 1998. On Custom in the Economy, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Siebenhüner, B., 2000. Homo Sustinens – Towards a new conception of humans for the science of sustainability. 
Ecological Economics 32 (1), pp. 15 – 25. 
Siegenthaler, H.,1997. Learning and its rationality in a context of fundamental uncertainty. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153 (4), pp. 743 – 761 
Simon, H. A., 1978. Rationality as process and as product of thought. Richard T. Ely Lecture. American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 68 (2), pp. 1 – 16. 
Soderbaum, P., 1999. Values, ideology and politics in Ecological Economics. Ecological Economics 28 (2), pp. 
161 – 170. 
SRU = Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen, Stellungnahme zur Anhörung der Monopolkommision zum 
Thema “Wettbewerb in der Kreislauf- und Abfallwirtschaft” am 18. Februar 2002. 
Stiglitz, J., 1998, The private use of public interests: Incentives and institutions. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 12 (2), pp. 3 – 21. 
Teece, D. and Pisano, G., 1994. The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction. Industrial and Corporate 
Change 3 (3), pp. 537 – 556. 
Trachtman, J.P., 2000. Regulatory competition and regulatory jurisdictions. Journal of International Economic 
Law 3, pp. 331 – 348. 
Walker, W. 2000. Entrapment in large technological systems: Institutional commitment and power relations. 
Research Policy 29, pp. 833 – 846. 
Wegner, G., 1997. Economic policy from an evolutionary perspective: A new approach. Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 153 (3), pp. 485 – 509. 
Weizsäcker, E.U.v., Lovins, A. B. and Lovins, L. H., 1997. Factor Four. Doubling Wealth – Halving Resource 
Use, Earthscan, London. 
Wubben, E.F.M. (Editor) 2000. The Dynamics of the Eco-Efficient Economy. Environmental Regulation and 
Competitive Advantage. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton. 
 
 
